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The latest act of the Greek tragedy is at play. Following the elections that took place in Greece in January 2015,
new negotiations have started between the Greek anti-austerity Government lead by Syriza and the pool of
European and international creditors over the terms of the bailout agreement. Swept into power by a clear
electoral mandate to end the austerity policy of the troika and to redress the humanitarian crisis, the new Greek
government has clashed with its creditors, who conditioned the award of financial support to the adoption of
domestic economic and social reforms. The Eurogroup, the informal grouping of minister of finance of the
Eurozone member states, has offered the forum in which negotiations between the parties has unfolded.
However, bargaining between Greece and its peers has quickly turned into a bilateral confrontation, with the
tense relations between Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis and German Finance Minister Schäuble capturing
the attention of the mass media.
The evolution of the Greek tragedy is still ongoing. After the Eurogroup soundly rejected initial proposals by
Greece for a marked policy shift, on 20 February 2015 the Greek government obtained from its peers a 4-month
extension of its current bailout agreement, to give time to the Greek authorities and the pool of creditors to agree
on a new detailed plan of economic reforms. Subsequently, Greece presented on 5 March 2015 a more specific
list of reforms to be implemented as a condition for financial support, which met only with halfhearted approval
by the Eurogroup, and negotiations are continuing (under the shadow of the ECB oversight on the liquidity of
Greek banks) both at the technical and political level with the aim to agree on a re-financing plan before the
summer. Nevertheless, beyond the technicalities, the events connected to the re-negotiation of the Greek bailout
confirm a number of long-standing features of the form of governance of the Eurozone, and call for urgent
reforms in the EU constitutional system.
First, economic governance in the Eurozone remains premised on an intergovernmental bargaining between
member states. While with the Maastricht Treaty the EU member states agreed to establish a purely federal
ECB, they refrained from creating an equally supranational economic policy by empowering the EU institutions.
Instead, they left economic policy as a matter for domestic politics, subject to intergovernmental coordination.
The euro-crisis has swept away the expectation that this would ensure the smooth functioning of EMU.
Nevertheless, member states responded to the crisis by creating institutions such as the EFSF and the ESM
which again work on the basis of an intergovernmental logic. In this context, it is not surprising that the
confrontation over the Greek fiscal crisis has resulted in a clash between member states – Greece vs. Germany
(the richest EU member state, and the main contributor to the EU rescue funds) – rather than in a confrontation
between alternative economic policy programs.
Second, in an intergovernmental framework such as the one of Eurozone governance, state power matters, and
larger and wealthier states dominate over smaller and poorer member states. As I have explained here, the EU
had historically been founded on a delicate compromise between state power and state equality. However, since
the eruption of the euro-crisis, the rise of intergovernmentalism in EU governance has upset this balance,
leading toward a dynamic of domination by larger/wealthier states over smaller/poorer ones. The situation in
Greece seems to confirm this. Despite the rhetoric in Athens, the new Greek government has not been able to
start a new economic deal, given opposition from its stronger creditors: Finance Minister Varoufakis had to
concede that any policy of the Greek government would have no negative fiscal effect. And while the Greek
government repeatedly called for discontinuing troika, it only obtained its cosmetic re-naming as “the
institutions”, with unchanged powers.
Third, following immediately on the previous point, it is clear that the intergovernmental framework of EU
governance poses a major challenge to democracy. As the handling of the Greek crisis is making clear, Greek
citizens are unable to shape their destiny through the electoral process (since their wishes for a clear shift away
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from austerity have been thwarted). And if they were, this would imply that German citizens would be unable to
shape their destiny through the electoral process (since their wishes for only limited financial support to Greece
would be disrespected). The Eurozone is based on separate claims of national democracies that cannot be
reconciled. In fact, it is precisely because voice is so limited that exit becomes such a viable option: the rise of
extreme parties, and street riots in Athens (and now also in Frankfurt) are the inevitable result of a situation in
which the people do not find a way to channel their discontent. As much as the Vice-President of the European
Commission Jyrki Katainen may believe that “we don’t change our policy according to elections,” that’s what
democracy is all about.
And this is why the need for constitutional reforms of the Eurozone is more urgent than ever. To begin with, the
Eurozone needs a fiscal capacity through which it can provide support to countries in fiscal troubles outside the
logic of inter-state transfers. Moreover, the institutional system of governance must be overhauled, creating
political institutions which can take decisions legitimately and effectively outside the logic of intergovernmental
negotiations, with its related problem of domination. It is ironic that Germany was historically willing to take steps
in this direction, while Greece was always in favor of an intergovernmental approach and wary to “cede” its
sovereignty to supranational authorities. The tragedy of the Greek crisis however set aside any expectation that
intergovernmentalism will protect the interest of the small states – least ensure a functioning governance
process in the Eurozone. EMU is an incomplete project. But perfecting our Union of states and citizens through
bold institutional reforms should be the aspiration of politicians willing to leave a legacy in history.
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